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I.

INTRODUCTION

In a succinct 1989 opinion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
decided Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, addressing claims for legal
1
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. In the years since, Padco
has been cited several times for its treatment of the fiduciary duty
claim. Indeed, it has become a leading case for the Minnesota
Court of Appeals when discussing the essential elements of a
2
breach of fiduciary duty claim. Practitioners, state and federal
† The author earned his J.D. with distinction from the University of Iowa
College of Law in 2008, where he was a member of the Pro Bono Society and a
Managing Editor of the Journal of Gender, Race & Justice. He formerly clerked for
Judge Kevin G. Ross at the Minnesota Court of Appeals, and for Judge Charles A.
Porter, Jr., in Minnesota’s Fourth Judicial District. He is currently an associate at
A•S•K Financial in Eagan, Minnesota. As a former court of appeals clerk, the
author has deep respect and admiration for the hardworking judges, clerks, and
staff of the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The author thanks his wife Virginia and
former appellate co-clerk Kristopher (Tip) Lee for their editorial input.
1. 444 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
2. On April 26, 2010, a search of Westlaw’s Minnesota statewide cases
database for “‘fiduciary duty’ /s element!” returned twenty-one results. Seventeen
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district courts, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals have all relied
upon Padco for what it purportedly states about the elements of a
3
breach of fiduciary duty claim. But careful scrutiny of Padco itself
and of other statements of Minnesota’s fiduciary duty law reveal
that Padco does not say what has been repeatedly attributed to it.
Padco is often cited to support the proposition that the
essential elements for a breach of fiduciary duty claim are the same
4
as the essential elements for a claim of negligence. But Padco does
not hold or stand for that proposition—the Padco court itself
5
recognized otherwise. The purpose of this article is to identify and
highlight the error with the hope that it will not be perpetuated to
the detriment of future claimants as well as to formulate a more
accurate statement of the essential elements of a fiduciary duty
claim under Minnesota law.

were opinions released after Padco. Five of those cite Padco, and a sixth cites a
federal district court case that relies on Padco. See Rucki v. Grazzini, Nos. A090694, A09-0700, A09-1693, 2010 WL 1286725, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2010)
(citing Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891, for the proposition that “the elements of a
breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim are the same as those of negligence.”); Mesenbrink
v. Riverwood ENT, LLC, No. A09-334, 2009 WL 3818378, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Nov. 17, 2009) (citing Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891, for the proposition that a
negligence claim has the same elements as a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Tyler
Holdings, Inc. v. JJT, LLC, No. A07-2046, 2008 WL 5136443, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 9, 2008) (citing Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891, for the idea that a negligence claim
has the same elements as a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Azbill v. Grande, No.
A04-2139, 2005 WL 1331718, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2005) (citing Padco,
444 N.W.2d at 891, for the idea that a negligence claim has the same elements as a
breach of fiduciary duty claim); Tisdell v. ValAdCo, Nos. C0-01-2054, C6-01-2060,
C2-01-2055, C6-01-2057, 2002 WL 31368336, at *13 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002)
(citing Conwed Corp. v. Emp’r Reinsurance Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1360, 1362 n.3
(D. Minn. 1993), which relies on Padco for the proposition that causation is a
required element for a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Star Centers, Inc. v. Faegre
& Benson, LLP, No. C0-00-2075, 2001 WL 605088, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 5,
2001) (citing Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891, for the proposition that the elements of a
breach of fiduciary claim are the same as those of a negligence claim). Each of
these is an unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals decision, and all reason
(expressly or implicitly) that Padco describes the necessary elements of a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.
3. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2; Conwed, 816 F. Supp. at 1362 n.3 (citing
Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891 for the proposition that the elements required for a
breach of fiduciary duty claim are the same as those for a negligence claim); see
also infra notes 8, 61.
4. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2 and infra note 61.
5. See infra Part III (arguing that Padco did not hold that the elements of
both negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are the same and explaining the
confusion).
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COURTS AND LITIGANTS ERRONEOUSLY RELY ON PADCO
WHEN DISCUSSING THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A
FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM

A string of unpublished court of appeals decisions cited Padco
for the proposition that “[u]nder Minnesota law, the elements
required to state a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim are the same as
6
those required to establish a negligence claim.” These cases
reached this conclusion by relying exclusively on an inference
7
drawn from Padco without any further discussion or analysis. In
one instance, the errant conclusion was reimported by the court of
appeals from a published federal case which drew the same
8
inference from Padco in the same manner. Federal and state trial
9
courts have been persuaded to draw the same flawed inference.
Concededly, the mistake is not without a certain intellectual
appeal. The notion that a legal cause of action requires, as a
threshold for sufficiency, an allegation of harm to the plaintiff
caused by the defendant is a familiar aspect of the law of
10
negligence. It seems to follow naturally to a judicious mind that if
a plaintiff did not suffer pecuniary or personal harm as a
consequence of a defendant’s acts, then why should the judicial
system be involved at all? The rationale’s appeal is magnified by
the easy parallels between a fiduciary duty claim and a negligence
6.
7.

Star Centers, 2001 WL 605088, at *3; see also cases cited supra note 2.
See cases cited supra note 2; see also THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION R. 1.2, at 54 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010)
(providing that the use of “see” citations is used when an authority does not directly
support a proposition, but supports the proposition by inference).
8. Tisdell v. ValAdCo, Nos. C0-01-2054, C6-01-2060, C2-01-2055, C6-01-2057,
2002 WL 31368336, at *13 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002) (citing Conwed Corp. v.
Emp’r Reinsurance Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1360, 1362 n.3 (D. Minn. 1993), a federal
case that relies exclusively on an inference ostensibly supported by Padco to draw
the same conclusion).
9. See, e.g., Conwed, 816 F. Supp. at 1362 n.3; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order for Judgment at 20, Swenson v. Bender, No. 02-C9-06-007901
(Minn. 10th D. Feb. 22, 2008), as reprinted in Appellant’s Brief Appendix at 45,
Swenson v. Bender, 764 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). But see Order, Carlson
v. Lindquist & Vennum, No. 27-CV-09-20302 (Minn. 4th D. Apr. 6, 2010)
(rejecting the argument that causation or harm are essential elements of a
fiduciary duty claim).
10. State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Aquila, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 879, 887 (Minn. 2006)
(stating elements of negligence claim); Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 583
N.W.2d 283, 290 n.8 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that Minnesota recognizes the
common law rule that injury is an essential element of negligence, and impliedly
recognizing the availability of nominal damages for other claims), rev’d on other
grounds, Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1999).
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claim: both unmistakably require a claimant to allege duty and
11
breach.
As it turns out, states are divided on the proper treatment of
breach of fiduciary duty causes of action.
Some states
unequivocally perceive the claim in the negligence tort vein and
12
require proof of harm and causation. But other states conclude
that breaches of fiduciary duty are inherently harmful and do not
13
require plaintiffs to prove harm in order to make a recovery. In
Minnesota, breach of a fiduciary duty is not a form of negligence,
14
but a distinct cause of action that sounds in equity.
Because the claim sounds in equity, fiduciary beneficiaries may
pursue a broader range of remedies than may be available to a
negligence claimant. A beneficiary may be “entitled to tort
damages for harm caused by the breach of duty arising from [a
fiduciary] relation” in accordance with the ordinary tort damages
15
rules. But
[i]n addition to or in substitution for [tort] damages the
beneficiary may be entitled to restitutionary recovery, since not
only is he entitled to recover for any harm done to his legally
protected interests . . ., but ordinarily he is entitled to profits
11. See Aquila, 718 N.W.2d at 887 (stating elements of negligence claim). But
see Swenson, 764 N.W.2d at 603–04 (explaining the court’s reluctance to substitute
breach of fiduciary duty claims for breach of duty under tort claims).
12. E.g., Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So.2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002) (requiring proximate
causation as an element of breach of fiduciary duty), cited in Thomas L.
Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, The Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians to
“Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services That are Not Medically Indicated,
39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 375 n.198 (2009); Miller v. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, No.
86327, 2006 WL 871621, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2006) (requiring proximate
causation of injury as an element for breach of fiduciary duty); Longaker v. Evans,
32 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (en banc) (requiring proof of damage as an
element for breach of fiduciary duty).
13. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts:
Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491,
524 n.195 (2009) (citing Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537,
543 (2d Cir. 1994); Zackiva Commc’ns Corp. v. Horowitz, 826 F. Supp. 86, 88
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn. 1982); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969)).
14. Swenson, 764 N.W.2d at 603–04; Commercial Assocs., Inc. v. Work
Connection, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 772, 778 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979) (“The remedy of a beneficiary against a
defaulting or negligent trustee is ordinarily in equity . . . .”); see also Hafemeister &
Bryan, supra note 13, at 524 n.195 (citing Rice, 320 N.W.2d at 411 as an example of
a decision that causation of harm is not a necessary element of fiduciary duty
claims).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979).
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that result to the fiduciary from his breach of duty . . . .
The right of a fiduciary breach claimant to compel disgorgement
or other noncompensatory remedies irrespective of actual harm
caused to the claimant by a defendant is well established common
17
law.
Indeed, these remedies are not only well established
18
common law, but they are specifically recognized in Minnesota.
III.

WHAT PADCO DOES AND DOES NOT SAY ABOUT FIDUCIARY
DUTY CAUSES OF ACTION

Hennepin County District Court Judge Beryl Nord granted
summary judgment to defendant David Fairbairn and his law firm
on November 10, 1988, putting to rest claims related to legal work
19
they had done for plaintiff Padco, Inc. in the early 1980s. Judge
Nord’s summary judgment decision was affirmed by the court of
appeals, and ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied
20
Padco’s petition for further review. Padco’s chief complaint was
that the Kinney & Lange law firm, which represented Padco in a
federal patent lawsuit, hired two attorneys who had worked for a
firm that had represented the adverse party in the patent
21
litigation. Kinney & Lange’s hiring decision led a federal judge to
disqualify Kinney & Lange from further representing Padco in the
22
patent litigation.
In its summary judgment decision, the district court
23
considered and decided a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The
court recognized the fiduciary duty claim even though it had not

16. Id.
17. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION §§ 190–201 (1937)
(detailing a series of restitutionary remedies available to the beneficiary that do
not require as a prerequisite harm caused by a fiduciary breach); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (explaining, in general, the concepts of fiduciary
duty, breach, and liability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 399–404A (1958)
(describing forms of liability that may arise against an agent that breaches a
fiduciary duty).
18. See, e.g., Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 212–13
(Minn. 1984); Commercial Assocs., 712 N.W.2d at 778–82; Padco, Inc. v. Kinney &
Lange, 444 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
19. Order & Memorandum, Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, No. CT 86-11447
(Minn. 4th D. Nov. 10, 1988).
20. Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, 444 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985),
review denied, Nov. 15, 1989.
21. Order & Memorandum, supra note 19, at 1.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5–6.
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24

been expressly identified in the complaint.
The district court
concluded that the claim had been sufficiently pled, but ultimately
determined that the plaintiff had not provided evidence that the
25
defendants had breached a fiduciary duty.
The district court’s decision to recognize the claim was not
expressly supported by legal citation, but the court was satisfied
that the plaintiff had adequate notice of the claim by virtue of the
26
complaint’s expressly stated claim for professional negligence.
The court reasoned that the claim for attorney malpractice
incorporated an implicit claim for breach of fiduciary duty, stating:
“An essential element of any negligence claim is that plaintiff must
prove that defendant owes him a duty. It is axiomatic that in an
attorney malpractice case the duty required is that of a fiduciary
27
nature.” The court concluded that the claim was sufficiently pled
on that basis, and proceeded to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s
evidence could support the conclusion that the defendants
28
breached the duty owed to Padco.
Determining that Padco’s
evidence was not sufficient on the element of breach, the district
29
court granted summary judgment.
30
Its brief on appeal contained extensive
Padco appealed.
31
argument concerning Minnesota’s law of fiduciary duty. Padco
argued that “Minnesota courts conclusively hold that attorneys who
breach their fiduciary duty to clients forfeit the right to
compensation” and that “if the attorney breaches his or her
fiduciary duty to the client, ‘the client is deemed injured even if no
32
actual loss results.’” Padco argued thoroughly that a claimant who
had suffered harm from a fiduciary’s breach did not need to prove
damages, citing three Minnesota Supreme Court decisions in
support of its argument: Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.
1986), Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 345 N.W.2d 209
33
(Minn. 1984), and Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982).
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 5–6.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Padco, Inc. v. Kinney & Lange, 444 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
31. Brief of Appellant at 10–12, Padco, 444 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(No. CT 86-11447).
32. Id. at 10 (quoting Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209,
212 (Minn. 1984)).
33. Id. at 11–12.
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Kinney & Lange and David Fairbairn (respondents in the
court of appeals) rejoined, unsurprisingly, that the district court’s
34
summary judgment decision was correct. They contended that
Padco “had failed to show any genuine issue of material fact” on its
breach of fiduciary duty claim, and that the three Perl cases did not
35
apply. Importantly, for purposes of this article, the respondents
36
made an additional argument in a footnote. Though there is no
reason to believe that the respondents could have anticipated its
effect, this surplus argument is the source of an error courts and
practitioners in Minnesota have been repeating for years. The
footnote reads as follows:
This theory was never alleged in plaintiff’s Complaint; the
claim was asserted in this litigation for the first time at the
time of the summary judgment motions, over two years
after the action was commenced. Plaintiff’s Complaint
only contains counts for professional negligence (Count
I), breach of contract (Count II), and punitive damages
(Count III).
Having been unable to produce any
evidence to establish proximate cause or damages,
plaintiff’s attempt to seek recovery on a theory not alleged
in its Complaint was untimely, and should not have been
considered. Obviously, however, the trial court’s error in
considering the untimely breach of fiduciary duty claim
37
was harmless in light of its decision on the merits.
The court of appeals identified two issues in the appeal:
whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment on
(1) Padco’s legal malpractice claims and (2) Padco’s breach of
38
fiduciary duty claims. To begin its discussion of the fiduciary duty
issue, the court noted that “[t]he parties disagree on whether the
39
complaint includes a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.” The
court then addressed the respondents’ footnoted argument that
40
the claim was not adequately pled. The court of appeals resolved
the issue in a single paragraph, but with language that has proved
fertile material for misinterpretation. The court wrote:

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Brief of Respondent at 14, Padco, 444 N.W. 889 (No. CT 86-11447).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14 n.3.
Id.
Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 890.
Id. at 891.
Id.
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The complaint contains three counts, separately labeled
as “Professional Negligence,” “Breach of Contract,” and
“Punitive Damages.” The negligence count alleges the
same elements which would be required for a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty. A specific legal theory does not
need to be stated if the pleadings contain factual notice of
the claim and a request for relief.
Under these
circumstances, the complaint sufficiently alleges a claim
41
for breach of fiduciary duty.
With that paragraph, the court of appeals held that Padco’s
complaint sufficiently pled a breach of fiduciary duty claim, even
42
though no such claim was expressly identified in the complaint.
The analysis and conclusion more or less reiterated the district
court’s determination, adding supporting legal authority for the
proposition that claims may be included in a complaint despite not
43
being expressly identified. In the remainder of the opinion, the
court proceeded to address the substance of the claim, and
concluded by determining that Padco failed to allege any fact that
44
would constitute a breach.
One sentence in that paragraph has inspired the pernicious
error at this article’s focus. The court’s statement that “[t]he
negligence count alleges the same elements which would be
45
required for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty” is the culprit—a
source of confusion that has confounded litigants and courts in the
years since Padco was decided.
To illustrate that Padco has been misunderstood, and that it
did not state or imply that negligence and fiduciary duty claims
have the same elements, it is useful to highlight what else the case
said and did not say about claims for breach of fiduciary duty. The
Padco court unequivocally acknowledged the Minnesota Supreme
46
Court precedents cited in the appellant’s brief.
The court of
appeals wrote that under Minnesota law,

41. Id. (citations omitted).
42. See id.
43. Compare id., with Order and Memorandum, supra note 19, at 5.
44. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891–92. This constituted a near-agreement with the
district court, which determined that Padco failed to provide evidence to support a
finding of breach. See Order and Memorandum, supra note 19, at 6.
45. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891.
46. See id.
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[o]nce an attorney’s breach of fiduciary duty is
established, the attorney clearly forfeits his right to
compensation for his services if the case involves actual
fraud or bad faith. In cases where there is no actual fraud
or bad faith, where there is no actual harm to the client, and
where the breach involves “multiple potential plaintiffs,”
the fee forfeiture may be scaled to the degree of
misconduct by consideration of the factors enumerated in
the punitive damages statute, Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 3
47
(1988).
The Padco court therefore recognized that a party may recover
for a breach of fiduciary duty that did not cause harm, and
impliedly recognized that the only essential elements of a claim are
duty and breach.
Padco should also be recognized for what it did not say: the
opinion failed to decide the fiduciary duty issue by concluding
48
Padco provided no evidence that the alleged breach caused harm.
The court’s analysis was divided into two numbered sections:
section I, addressing Padco’s claim for professional negligence, and
49
section II, dealing with the claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Section I concluded when the court affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on the negligence claim, on the basis
that Padco failed to prove that the defendants’ negligence
50
proximately caused damage. The court had a clear opportunity to
decide the fiduciary duty issue on the same basis and conclude the
51
opinion without further discussion. The omission makes perfect
sense in light of the court’s recognition that a plaintiff with a
fiduciary duty claim can recover even “where there is no actual
harm.” Having correctly recognized that Minnesota law does not
require causation of damages as a necessary element in a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty, the court addressed the fiduciary duty
issue separately.
47. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891 (emphasis added) (citing for support Gilchrist
v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. 1986)).
48. See id. at 891–92.
49. Id. at 890–91.
50. Id. at 891.
51. Padco’s fiduciary duty claim was premised entirely on the facts it alleged
to establish its claim for negligence. Id.; Order & Memorandum, supra note 19, at
5. Assuming arguendo that a breach of fiduciary duty claim has the same essential
elements as a negligence claim, then the fate of the fiduciary duty claim should
have been determined by the same lack of damages evidence that defeated
Padco’s negligence claim.
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As is hopefully clear at this point, the court of appeals was not
directly asked in Padco to decide the essential elements of a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty. And in no way do the analysis or
conclusions in Padco support a conclusion that the essential
elements of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are the same.
The Padco court was asked to decide whether a plaintiff’s claim had
sufficiently stated a cause of action, which the court decided in the
affirmative by concluding that the facts alleged in the complaint
were sufficient to sustain the claim. In doing so, it stated that
“[t]he negligence count alleges the same elements which would be
52
required for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty.” That is, in the
complaint filed by Padco, the count identified as a negligence
count specifically alleged facts sufficient to sustain a claim for
fiduciary duty. The court of appeals was not making a statement
about negligence claims, generally; it was making a statement about
the specific negligence count (and the facts incorporated therein)
in Padco’s complaint. Nor was the court of appeals making a
statement of law about the elements of fiduciary duty breach
claims, except to say that whatever the essential elements are, they
were present in Padco’s complaint.
Put another way, it would be correct to infer from Padco that a
claim for professional negligence against an attorney necessarily
includes a distinct claim for breach of fiduciary duty—the
allegations necessary to state the first claim will generally include
53
allegations sufficient to sustain the second. But it is invalid to
conclude based on Padco that the cause of action known as breach
of fiduciary duty and the cause of action for negligence bear
identical essential elements. Not only does Padco not say such a
thing—it recognized the contrary! The Padco court recognized that
a claim for breach of fiduciary duty could be sustained even in the
54
absence of harm to the plaintiff.
The court’s troublesome
statement that Padco’s “negligence count alleges the same
elements” means only that the factual allegations necessary to
sustain a fiduciary duty claim were a subset of the facts Padco

52. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891.
53. Or, as the district court’s summary judgment decision in Padco more
eloquently explained, “[a]n essential element of any negligence claim is that
plaintiff must prove that defendant owes him a duty. It is axiomatic that in an
attorney malpractice case the duty required is that of a fiduciary nature.” Order
and Memorandum, supra note 19, at 5.
54. Padco, 444 N.W.2d at 891.
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alleged to support its professional negligence claim.
IV.

THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY CLAIM IN MINNESOTA ARE DUTY AND BREACH

As explained above, harm caused by a defendant is not a
56
If a
necessary element of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
claimant establishes the existence of a fiduciary relationship and
the breach of a duty arising from that relationship, then harm is
57
implied by the breaching party’s violation of trust and loyalty.
Consequently, there are only two essential elements of a claim for
58
breach of fiduciary duty in Minnesota: duty and breach.
Fiduciary duties arise when two parties are in a fiduciary
59
relationship. Once a fiduciary relationship is established, a variety
of fiduciary duties arise, generally including duties of loyalty and
60
fidelity.
It may be that a party seeking only to recover
compensatory damages from a wayward fiduciary may need to
61
establish that a breach caused the damages.
But because
compensation is not the only viable theory of recovery for a
fiduciary duty claim, and because a party may recover without
62
having been harmed at all, neither damages nor causation of

55. Id. The beginning of the troublesome sentence would be more accurately
phrased as “[Plaintiff’s] negligence count alleges . . . .” than its current form.
56. Commercial Assocs., Inc. v. Work Connection, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 772, at
778 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345
N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 1984)); see also Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 13, at 524
n.195 (2009).
57. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d at 212–13.
58. See id.; see also Swenson v. Bender, 764 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. Ct. App.
2009).
59. Swenson, 764 N.W.2d at 601 (“Fiduciary relationships arise when one
person trusts and confides in another who has superior knowledge and
authority.”) (citing Carlson v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2007). “A ‘fiduciary’ is ‘[a] person who is required to act for the benefit
of another person on all matters within the scope of their relationship.” Id. (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004)).
60. Id.; Commercial Assocs., 712 N.W.2d at 779.
61. See Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 583 N.W.2d 283, 287–88, 288
n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing a professional negligence claim), rev’d on
other grounds, 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1999). Herrmann is another decision by the
Minnesota Court of Appeals with language that could be construed to conflate
causes of action premised on negligence and fiduciary duty.
62. See St. Paul Fire & Marine, 345 N.W.2d at 212 (providing that
disgorgement is available in lieu of nominal damages); Commercial Assocs., 712
N.W.2d at 778 (recognizing same).
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damages are essential elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
It is significant that the court of appeals cases construing Padco
to stand for the contrary proposition are unpublished; the errant
64
construction of the case has not become binding precedent. No
published court of appeals opinion has yet embraced the same
reasoning, and the binding case law on the issue unequivocally
refutes the notion that the elements of fiduciary duty and
65
negligence claims are identical. But the persuasive nature of this
series of unpublished court of appeals opinions has undoubtedly
affected claimants at the trial and appellate levels in the state of
Minnesota, and possibly more often and more significantly than on
occasions identified in this article. Despite the established case law
66
set forth in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Perl cases, and
discussed in great length in court of appeals cases like Commercial
67
68
Associates, the misapplication of Padco continues to recur. It may
take an express, published disapproval released by one of
Minnesota’s appellate courts to extinguish the error once and for
all. It seems almost inevitable that the court of appeals will again
be invited by a party resisting a fiduciary breach claim to
misconstrue Padco, and on that occasion, the court can right the
course of Minnesota’s fiduciary duty law by expressly declining the
invitation.

63. The fiduciary duty cause of action is not unique for its lack of harm and
causation elements. Damage is not a necessary element for a cause of action that
supports an award of nominal damages, like trespass. See Wendinger v. Forst
Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that a cause of
action for trespass requires only two elements: possession and unlawful entry);
Lake Mille Lacs Inv., Inc. v. Payne, 401 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that a party having established a trespass is entitled to nominal damages).
The trespass action may provide a closer analogy for the elements of a fiduciary
duty claim than the negligence action—both require two elements, if the elements
are proven, harm is implied, and proof of compensable damages is optional rather
than necessary.
64. See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subdiv. 3(a–c) (2008).
65. Commercial Assocs., 712 N.W.2d at 778 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine, 345
N.W.2d 209).
66. Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1986); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d
407 (Minn. 1982); St. Paul Fire & Marine, 345 N.W.2d 209.
67. Commercial Assocs., 712 N.W.2d at 778.
68. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2; c.f. Defendant’s Letter Requesting
Reconsideration from Terrance Flemming to Judge Porter, Carlson v. Lindquist &
Vennum, No. 27-CV-09-20302 (Minn. 4th D. Apr. 6, 2010) (citing unpublished
court of appeals opinions that rely on Padco for the proposition that negligence
and fiduciary duty claims have the same elements) (on file with author).
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